Introduction

Justifying Reparations at the International Criminal Court
Reparations in the Rome Statute were one of the cornerstones of a more victimcentred approach of the ICC, distinguishing it from previous international criminal tribunals. In the early drafts of the Rome Statute before the International Law Commission some delegates felt that reparations would be inappropriate for a criminal court, owing to their complexity and the large numbers of victims affected by international crimes. 3 In order to overcome this a trust fund was include for the 'benefit of victims of crime' collected from fines or confiscated property. 4 Subsequently the Preparatory Commission deemed it was more feasible to make the state responsible for reparations if an individual convicted person acting in an official capacity was indigent, or in the case of non-state actors to allow the Court to recommend reparations to the affected state. 5 At the Rome Conference there was a general consensus amongst states to prevent the ICC having the authority to order reparations against a state as a dealbreaker, as it would detract from punishing individual perpetrators. 6 As a result It make legal sense that a person should only be held to account for the crimes of which they are found guilty and the added expressive dimensions for victims in acknowledging the convicted person's responsibility for their suffering, 13 However, it very much reflects that reparations are an 'add-on' to the criminal trial. This is contrary to the nature of reparations, which are intended to be victim-centred in responding to their harm, rather than being dependent on the identification, prosecution or conviction of an accused. 14 As Stahn asserts the Appeals Chamber stipulates a more 'perpetrator-centred' vision of reparations at the ICC. 15 This has implications on the burden of proof, proportionality of reparations of which the perpetrator is found liable and the role victims in the trial proceedings. 16 As Williams and Palmer note similar limitations with the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, prosecutors can be cautious in how they approach or neglect certain crimes, closing or limiting avenues for victims to obtain redress before international courts. 17 The convoluted nature of reparations at the ICC and the narrow victim eligibility for such measures is further obscured by the role of the Trust Fund and its assistance programmes.
Role of the Trust Fund for Victims and its assistance mandate
Despite an Appeals Chamber decision and order on reparations, the role of the TFV and its mandate for reparations and assistance still remain contested. In the Lubanga case the TFV, which has been funding a number of assistance programmes in the DRC, was held by the Trial Chamber as being 'well placed' to 'determine appropriate forms of reparations and to implement them'. 18 The Appeals Chamber modified the Trial Chamber's approach, which made victim participation dependent on whether the TFV 'considers it appropriate'. 19 Moreover, the Appeals Chamber stipulated that victims would be consulted on collective reparations before the TFV implements them, clawing back some of victims' agency in the reparation process. 20 However, the Appeals Chamber rejected the Trial Chamber's endorsement of the TFV's suggestion of community-based reparations. 21 As a result, the Appeals Chamber clarified the line between reparations and assistance, with the former being responsive to victims' The continuing wrangling over reparations between the judges and TFV suggests that the Trust Fund is struggling to fit its mostly assistance approach into a juridical one, where it is used to more discretion in distributing funds based on needs rather than responding to victims' rights. 25 This reflects a critical juncture between reparations as a right to be claimed by victims with legal standing against a discretionary needs-based approach. The TFV's role in reparations risks diluting victims' 'right' to reparation by merging it with assistance. The Appeals Chamber only recognised that assistance and reparations may become blurred where it risks prejudicing the rights of the convicted person, rather than as a concern for ensuring victims' right to reparation.
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It is likely that the vast majority of cases before the ICC that result in reparations will always be dependent on the TFV for financial support and reparations delivery. In cases where perpetrators have substantial financial assets these are likely to be depleted through funding their defence counsel, such as the in Bemba case where the defendant had over €5 million in assets seized, but over €2.79 million had been spent by December 2014 and he is now a defendant in a witnessing tampering trial.
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As Dixon refers to this as the 'Swiss cheese model' whereby the TFV assistance mandate is used to 'fill in the gaps of reparations regimes where they are restricted by legal definitions of victims and victimization'. 28 However the difficulty with reparations at the ICC is that these gaps remain quite wide that even assistance if well coordinated is unlikely to sufficiently provide any meaningful redress to victims.
In all the emerging ICC reparations regime is overly elaborate and a headache even for lawyers. This complex system is likely to change with the second case of Katanga where most victims are looking for individual compensation, rather than more collective awards made in the Lubanga case.
Acquittals and the responsibility of the state
The final contested area of reparations at the ICC involves situations where a defendant is not found responsible for a crime, such as there being insufficient evidence against them, the defendant dies during the trial, declared unfit or is acquitted, preventing any reparation proceedings. This is the situation that judges faced in the collapse of the Ruto and Sang case due to insufficient evidence against the accused. The judges were divided on whether or not reparations could be ordered despite no one being convicted. As Judge Fremr bluntly stated women as well as on social and economic rights. 39 According to Rubin-Marín, reparations can also have a transformational potential 'to subvert, instead of reinforce, pre-existing structural … inequalities and thereby to contribute, however minimally, to the consolidation of more inclusive democratic regimes'. 40 Yet, ruptures in governance and the law may not offer opportune moments to reform social and cultural perceptions and practices when more pressing needs of security, peace and redress need to be tackled.
There has been increasing attention to tackle sexual violence in terms of transformative reparations to better address the causes and cultures that precipitate such violence. 41 The Nairobi be directed at preventing future conflicts and raising awareness that the effective reintegration of the children requires eradicating the victimisation, discrimination and stigmatisation of young people in these circumstances.
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The Appeals Chamber agreed with such an approach, given that it is up for the TFV to deliver reparations. 46 It may just all be hopefully thinking and rhetoric that one reparation award by the ICC can transform a society and prevent future conflict. Durbach and Chappell note that the transformational reparations proposed by the TFV and Chamber suggest an 'aspirational' goal, but was not challenged by other parties before the Court. 47 Ullrich in her research of Court judges and staff suggest that transformative reparations is superficial and even neo-colonial. 48 The ICC does not have a democratic mandate to reform State Parties' societies through reparations.
Transformative reparations need to be placed within their political, economic, social and cultural context. 49 Moreover, using victims' claims for reparations as a means of 
Revisiting reparative complementarity
If the ICC is an ineffectual or inappropriate locus in delivering transformative reparations, then the State in which the crime occurs is the necessary actor to ensure the rights of victims. 54 In the Lubanga case the judges missed an opportunity to call upon the Congolese government to establish a national reparations mechanism, instead it suggested that the State could cooperate through educational or outreach activities to acknowledge victims' harm and to increase society's awareness of the crimes committed by Mr Lubanga.
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The relationship between the Court and State Parties is guided by the principle of complementarity, in that states have the primary obligation to investigate and prosecute international crimes with the ICC only intervening as a last resort where the state is unable or unwilling to meet its obligations, so-called 'negative complementarity'. 56 Positive complementarity is in narrow terms how States can be encouraged to investigate and prosecute international crimes, in broader terms how the ICC can catalyse wider transitional justice processes in a country guided by fair trial practices and human rights. In terms of reparations, complementarity could begin to fill the gap between the limited scope of victims who will be eligible for redress at the ICC and the larger population of individuals and groups who have suffered from international crimes in a situation. This has been termed 'reparative complementarity' in that to effectively provide reparations in a situation such as the DRC, the State Party needs to create a domestic reparations programme to complement any reparation awards by the Court. 57 Otherwise reparations at the ICC only benefit a few victims in a situation, which could cause tensions within communities or secondary 
